

## Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

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INFO USNMR SHAPE

DIA WASHDC

AMCONSUL NICE

AMCONSUL MARSEILLE

AMCONSUL BORDEAUX

AMCONSUL STRASBOURG

AMCONSUL LYON

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 20389

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PINT, FR, PGOV, UR

SUBJ: THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY (PCF) - TOTEM AND TABOO  
IN PREPARING FOR THE ELECTIONS

SUMMARY: AS THE PCF GEARS UP FOR THE LEGISLATIVE  
ELECTIONS NOW SET FOR 1978, SEVERAL ASSETS AND LIABILI-  
TIES STAND OUT IN SHARP RELIEF. THIS CABLE SUGGESTS  
THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE:

--HOVERING ON THE EDGE OF A MAJOR SWING BACK TO  
AUTHORITARIANISM;

--KEPT FROM DOING SO BY THE PERENNIAL HOPE OF  
ACCESSION TO POWER;

--WORKING OUT AN UNEASY NEW BALANCE WHICH WILL  
GUIDE THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALISTS (PS) DURING  
THIS PERIOD OF WAITING.

AT THE SAME TIME, THIS CABLE ALSO SUGGESTS THAT THE  
PCF IDENTIFICATION WITH THE LEGITIMATE POLITICAL PRO-  
CESS, AN IDENTIFICATION BEGUN IN 1968, HAS PROGRESSED  
SO FAR THAT ONLY BY DOING A TOTAL ABOUT-FACE COULD THE  
PARTY RESUME ITS SPOILER ROLE IN FRENCH LEFT POLITICS.  
FINALLY, WE NOTE WITH INTEREST THE PCF'S IDENTITY CRISIS  
OVER RELATIONS WITH THE CPSU. END SUMMARY.

#### 1. INTERNAL PROBLEMS

THE PCF - ITS OWN CHANGES: SINCE 1969 THE PCF HAS  
BEEN PUBLICLY COMMITTED TO SEARCHING FOR POWER THROUGH  
THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AT ALL LEVELS (ALTHOUGH IT HAD  
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ENDORSED MITTERRAND'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY IN 1965).  
ITS CONCERNS, THEREFORE, HAVE BEEN TO BUILD AN IMAGE OF  
RESPECTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY AND TO RID ITSELF OF THE  
XENOPHOBIC PUBLIC REACTIONS TO THIS PARTY WHICH HAS SO  
LONG PREACHED INTERNATIONAL WORKING CLASS SOLIDARITY.  
IN SHORT, THE PCF HAS BEEN TRYING TO BECOME AS LEGITIMATE  
AS ANY OTHER FRENCH POLITICAL PARTY. WHILE IT HAS NOT  
TOTALLY SUCCEEDED IN THIS EFFORT, ITS IMAGE WITH NON-  
COMMUNIST FRENCH VOTERS HAS IMPROVED--WHERE TWO YEARS  
AGO A BARE THIRD OF THE POLLED FRENCH PUBLIC BELIEVED  
IN THE PCF'S HONESTY WHEN THE COMMUNISTS SAID THEY COULD  
BE VOTED IN AND VOTED OUT OF POWER, TODAY NEARLY HALF  
OF THE FRENCH VOTERS ARE WILLING TO MAKE THE ACT OF  
FAITH. EMBASSY PARIS HAS BEEN REPORTING ON THAT PROCESS  
--THE LIST BELOW IS MERELY A REMINDER AND A CHECKLIST  
OF THE MAJOR STEPS IN THAT PROCESS:

--IN THE 1974 EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS (VITRY), THE  
PCF FOR THE FIRST TIME ALLOWED A FLOOR DEBATE TO AMEND  
VARIOUS PROPOSITIONS WHICH THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAD  
BROUGHT TO THE CONGRESS;

--IN 1975 THE PARTY BEGAN A SERIES OF ATTACKS ON  
PRACTICES IN THE SOVIET UNION. WHILE MOST OF THESE

INVOLVED ONLY MILD DISAPPROBATION OF THE MOST EGREGIOUS  
VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ALMOST UNNOTICED AT FIRST  
WERE THE PCF'S SEVERAL EFFORTS TO DISTINGUISH ITSELF  
FROM CPSU ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PLANNING;

--THE PARTY'S XXIIND CONGRESS (ST-OUEN), IN  
FEBRUARY 1976, REMOVED ONE OF THE MAJOR IDEOLOGICAL  
STUMBLING BLOCKS TO THE PRACTICE OF ALTERNATION IN POWER  
BY DROPPING THE OLD COMMUNIST SHIBBOLETH OF "THE  
DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT" FROM ITS TENETS;

--SHORTLY AFTER THE NOVEMBER 1976 AMERICAN ELEC-  
TIONS, THE PCF ISSUED A WARM STATEMENT WHICH WENT

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BEYOND THEIR USUAL BLAST AT AMERICAN-STYLE DEMOCRACY;  
THE PCF COMMUNIQUE TENTATIVELY EXPRESSED HOPE AT THE  
CARTER ELECTION.

2. INTERNAL PCF REACTION TO THE CHANGES: IT HAS  
BECOME A CLICHE TO NOTE THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE STILL  
SPLIT BETWEEN THE SOFT-LINERS, WHO GENERALLY FOLLOW THE  
LEAD OF SECRETARY-GENERAL GEORGES MARCHAIS, AND THE  
HARD-LINERS, A DIMINISHING NUMBER WHOSE LOYALTIES HAVE  
GONE FROM THE LATE JACQUES DUCLOS TO THE LATE BENOIT  
FRACHON AND WHO ARE NOW SEARCHING FOR A LEADER (READ:  
WHO ARE NOW RELATIVELY LEADERLESS BECAUSE MARCHAIS HAS  
STACKED THE POLITBURO AND SECRETARIAT OF THE PARTY WITH  
HIS OWN PEOPLE). NEVERTHELESS, WHILE MARCHAIS HAS BEEN  
ABLE TO WIELD A RELATIVELY FREE HAND UNTIL VERY RECENTLY,  
SOME OBSERVERS OF THE PCF ARGUE THAT HIS FREEDOM OF  
MANEUVER IS DWINDLING. SEVERAL FACTORS MAY EXPLAIN  
THIS:

--THE CGT CONSIDERED BY SOME TO BE LESS AN INSTRU-  
MENT OF PCF WILL THAN IS OFTEN BELIEVED, HAS STRUCK OUT  
ON A RELATIVELY MORE INDEPENDENT COURSE AS THE ELECTIONS  
APPROACH. IN PART A RESPONSE TO WHAT CGT LEADERS CLAIM  
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APPROACH. IN PART A RESPONSE TO WHAT CGT LEADERS CLAIM-  
TO BE AN INCREASINGLY MILITANT RANK-AND-FILE, SUCH

AGGRESSIVITY MAY ALSO BE AN EXPRESSION OF FEAR THAT THE CFDT, WHOSE REPUTATION FOR PROGRAMMATIC DEMAGOGUERY IS GROWING, HAS OUTSTRIPPED THE CGT IN ITS DEMANDS (SEE PARIS 18680).

--WHETHER MARCHAIS WANTS TO BELIEVE IT OR NOT (AND THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT HE WAS SLOW TO DO SO), AN INCREASING NUMBER OF YOUNGER PARTY MEMBERS AND INTELLECTUALS ARE BECOMING IMPATIENT WITH THE "SLOW" SOLUTIONS IMPLIED IN THE UNION OF THE LEFT. THIS IMPATIENCE TRANSLATES A FEAR THAT THE PCF'S IDENTITY, ITS SOCIO-POLITICAL SPECIFICITY IS BEING THREATENED BY THE ALLIANCE WITH THE PS AND LEFT RADICALS (MRG). IN ORDER TO COMBAT SUCH FEARS, MARCHAIS IS DEPLOYING AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE PARTY'S HEAVY ARTILLERY. IN RECENT WEEKS, THE INTELLECTUALS', WRITERS' AND ARTISTS' SECTION OF THE PARTY HAS LISTENED TO A STEADY PROCESSION OF THE TOP NAMES IN THE PCF STRIVING TO CLARIFY THE MARCHAIS LINE (READ: SEEKING TO GET INTELLECTUAL AND IDEOLOGICAL APPROVAL FOR IT).

--PCF RELATIONS WITH THE PS, WHILE NOT IN ANY WAY ENDANGERING THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE UNION OF THE LEFT, HAVE BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY A STEADY INCREASE IN AND IDEOLOGICAL APPROVAL FOR IT).

--PCF RELATIONS WITH THE PS, WHILE NOT IN ANY WAY ENDANGERING THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE UNION OF THE LEFT, HAVE BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY A STEADY INCREASE IN TENSION. WHILE THE PARTIES ARE STILL FAR FROM THE OUTRIGHT WAR WHICH CHARACTERIZED THE SUMMER OF 1975, TODAY'S PROSPECTS ARE FOR A PERIOD OF INCREASED HOSTILITY (SEE BELOW) OVER ISSUES RANGING THROUGH THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES.

3. SOCIALISTS AND COMMUNISTS: ALWAYS PRESENT IN THE PCF MENTALITY IS THE FEAR THAT THE PS WILL ONE DAY SELL  
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OUT TO WHAT THE COMMUNISTS CALL "THE REFORMIST TEMPTATION." BY THIS, THE PCF BELIEVES THE SOCIALISTS TO BE IN A STATE OF CONTINUAL TEMPTATION TO GIVE UP THEIR ALLIANCE WITH THE COMMUNISTS IN FAVOR OF SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD PUT THEM INTO A "THIRD FORCE" WITH NON-MARXIST PARTIES. THUS EACH MOVE ON GISCARD'S PART (STATING THAT HE WILL STAY IN POWER SHOULD THE LEFT WIN; LEAKING RUMORS OF A POSSIBLE ELYSEE/SOCIALIST ACCORD ON EUROPEAN MATTERS) OR CHIRAC'S (PRIVATELY TELLING THE PRESS THAT HE IS SURE GISCARD WOULD PREFER TO GOVERN WITH MITTERRAND IN THE MATIGNON RATHER THAN CHIRAC) GETS CAREFUL PCF STUDY TO SEE IF IT MIGHT IN FACT TEMPT THE SOCIALISTS TO OVERTHROW THE PCF CONNECTION. THE RECENTLY-CONCLUDED PS CONGRESS OF NANTES HAS

DONE NOTHING TO ALLAY PCF SUSPICIONS. MITTERRAND CAME OUT OF THAT CONGRESS WITH WHAT THE PCF FEARS IS A CHARTER FOR SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC (RATHER THAN MARXIST/COMMON PROGRAM) SOLUTIONS TO FRENCH ELECTORAL POLITICS. HE ALSO CAME OUT OF IT WITH THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER EFFECTIVE PRESSURE FROM HIS OWN LEFTHAVING SUCCESSFULLY BEATEN DOWN THE CERES CHALLENGE. PERHAPS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT TO MANY PCF OBSERVERS (AND THIS POINT HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY URGED ON THE RANK-AND-FILE BY MEMBERS OF THE PCF POLITBURO AND SECRETARIAT), THE PS HAS ONLY GIVEN A TEPID RECEPTION TO THE VARIOUS CHANGES IN POLICY (SEE BELOW) WHICH THE PCF HAS MADE IN RECENT MONTHS. FINALLY, A STILL GREATER THREAT IS PERCEIVED BY THE COMMUNISTS IN THE PS REFUSAL TO ACCEPT A HIGHER DEGREE OF MARXIST CONTENT IN THE

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CURRENT RENEGOTIATION/UPDATING OF THE COMMON PROGRAM.  
WHERE THE PCF WANTS THE EMOTIONAL SATISFACTION OF GOING  
INTO LEGISLATIVE ELECTION BATTLE WITH THE MARXIST  
BANNERS FLYING HIGH, THE SOCIALISTS APPEAR TO HAVE  
CHOSEN THE ROUTE WHICH MITTERRAND HAS ALWAYS CALLED  
"ARTISTIC FUZZINESS"--AND THAT TERRIFIES THE IDEOLOGUES  
OF THE PCF WHO SEE IN SUCH FUZZINESS ONLY A WAY OF CON-  
VENIENTLY FORGETTING THE TOUGHER PROVISIONS OF THE  
COMMON PROGRAM IN THE SEARCH FOR VOTES.

4. THE CONTINUING PROBLEM OF DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM:  
IN A COUNTRY IN WHICH ANY POLITICAL DISCUSSION IS LIKELY  
TO BE THE START OF A NEW POLITICAL PARTY, THE PCF'S  
CHANGES ARE TAKING PLACE AGAINST A CONTINUING BACKDROP  
OF AUTHORITARIANISM. DROPPING THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE  
PROLETARIAT, BACKING OFF FROM TOTAL OPPOSITION TO THE  
CONCEPT OF EUROPE AND ADAPTING TO THE REALITY OF THE  
FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE ARE ALL CHANGES DECIDED AT THE  
TOP OF THE PARTY AND ENDORSED BY THE CLASSICALLY LOP-  
SIDED VOTES WHICH CHARACTERIZED PCF BEHAVIOR IN THE BAD  
OLD DAYS OF STALINISM. WHILE MANY OBSERVERS BELIEVE  
THAT IN MAKING ITS CHANGES FROM THE TOP DOWN THE  
COMMUNISTS ARE MERELY ACTING OUT A TRADITION WHICH  
DATES FROM THE TIMES OF THE MONARCHY (AND IN SO DOING  
ARE MERELY EXAGGERATING THE BEHAVIOR OF MOST OTHER  
PARTIES IN FRANCE), THE FACT REMAINS THAT PUBLIC SENSI-  
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TIVITY TO OVERT DISPLAYS OF AUTHORITARIANISM RUNS HIGH. THUS, WHILE THE PUBLIC IS GENERALLY SPARED THE GRUBBIER DETAILS OF THE BATTLES WHICH WE UNDERSTAND TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE BETWEEN MARCHAIS AND SOME OF THE HARDER-LINE PARISIANS, THE INTERIOR OF THE PARTY CAN SOMETIMES BE SEEN LICKING ITS WOUNDS OVER SUCH DISPLAYS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S POWER. AND EVEN THE GENERAL PUBLIC CAN BE HEARD TO COMMENT NOT ON THE FACT OF CHANGE--WHILE ADMITTING THAT THERE IS CHANGE IN THE PARTY'S VIEWS--BUT ON THE WAY IN WHICH IT IS CARRIED OUT. SOME OF THE PUBLIC VOLTES-FACE INVOLVING THE PCF'S NEWLY-SOFTENED ATTITUDE ON PORTUGAL AND SPAIN, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE RECEIVED PRAISE FOR THEIR SUBSTANTIVE IMPORTANCE AND DERISION FOR THEIR TOTAL LACK OF DISCUSSION WITHIN THE PARTY. ONE OMINOUS PORTENT FOR THE FUTURE, THUS, IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH PCF LEADERS FEEL THEMSELVES FREE TO MAKE CHANGES IN THE PARTY'S FOREIGN POLICY WITHOUT ANY REFERENCE TO PUBLIC OPINION. IN A COUNTRY WHERE PRO-AMERICANISM AND ANTI-ATLANTICISM STILL STRUGGLE FOR DOMINANCE, THAT IS NOT REASSURING.

## 5. POLICIES

DEFENSE ISSUES: THE PCF HAS RECENTLY "ACCEPTED" THE FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE; THE PS HAS NOT MADE A FORMAL DECLARATION IN THIS SENSE BUT IS WIDELY BELIEVED TO ACCEPT IT (AND PRIVATELY INSISTS THAT IT DOES). FOR THE PCF, THIS MOVE MARKS STILL ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO REASSURE THE FRENCH PUBLIC THAT IT IS A LEGITIMATE PARTY WHICH WILL NOT SACRIFICE FRENCH NATIONAL DEFENSE IN THE NAME OF SOME VAGUE CONCEPT OF WORKING CLASS INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY. THE PS, ON THE OTHER HAND, KNOWS THAT THE ISSUE IS DIVISIVE WITHIN ITS OWN PARTY AND MAY EVEN BE MORE DIFFICULT (BECAUSE AFTER ALL, THE PS ALLOWS MORE DEBATE THAN THE PCF) FOR IT TO SOLVE PUBLICLY THAN IT WAS FOR THE COMMUNISTS. THUS THE COMMUNISTS, WHO MIGHT, AT LEAST FOR ELECTORAL PURPOSES,

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WISH TO MOVE TOWARDS WHAT THEY CALL AN ITALIAN POSITION (I.E., NATO IS USEFUL BECAUSE IT PROVIDES A COUNTER-WEIGHT IN THE EUROPEAN EQUILIBRIUM TO THE VAST LAND POWER TO THE EAST) ARE STYMIED--THEY CAN GO NO FURTHER THAN THE PS WITHOUT APPEARING TO HAVE MOVED TO THE RIGHT OF THE SOCIALISTS. AND THAT THEY ARE UNWILLING TO DO (OR APPEAR TO DO). THE PRINCIPAL PCF NEGOTIATORS ON THE DEFENSE ASPECTS OF THE COMMON PROGRAM ARE THEREFORE FRUSTRATED AND ARE LOOKING FOR ANOTHER WAY OUT OF THE DILEMMA. IDEALLY, THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE PS MAKE



SOME SORT OF PRO-NATO DECLARATION WHICH WOULD THEN  
LEAVE THE PCF FREE TO ATTACK (AND THEREBY PROVE ONCE  
MORE ITS LEFT LEGITIMACY); A MORE REALISTIC PCF VIEW  
DEMANDS ONLY A GREATER DEGREE OF PRECISION FROM THE PS  
ON FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES.

5. THE NATO STUMBLING BLOCK: AS LONG AS THE COMMON  
PROGRAM GIVES IDEOLOGICAL LEGITIMACY TO THE LEFT'S  
VIEWS ON NATO (BOTH NATO AND THE PACT ARE REALITIES;  
FRANCE'S ADHERENCE TO NATO SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL BOTH  
THE PACT AND NATO ARE REPLACED BY A MORE EQUITABLE  
MECHANISM), THE PCF CANNOT PRESS ITS VIEWS ON NATIONAL

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DEFENSE WITHOUT FALLING INTO EITHER THE SCYLLA OF PRO-AMERICANISM OR THE CHARYBDIS OF PAN-EUROPEANISTIC DEFENSE SOLUTIONS. THE COMMUNISTS ARE THUS SEEKING WAYS AROUND THE PROBLEM AND HAVE, TO THIS END, MULTIPLIED THEIR CONTACTS WITH OTHER PARTIES IN LATIN EUROPE. BUT EVEN THE FACT OF THESE CONTACTS IS TAKEN RATHER BADLY BY THE RANK-AND-FILE, WHICH SEES IN THEM A THREAT TO THE VERY IDENTITY OF THE PARTY AS IT ASSOCIATES ITSELF WITH THE "BOURGEOIS ITALIANS" AND THE "RADICAL" PORTUGUESE. AS THE CONTACTS ARE MULTIPLIED, THE RANK-AND-FILE REACTIONS BECOME MORE VEHEMENT AND FUEL THE RISING TIDE OF NEO-STALINISM. THIS IS NOT TO SAY, OF COURSE, THAT MARCHAIS HAS A PARTY REVOLT ON HIS HANDS. RATHER, IT SUGGESTS THAT MARCHAIS CAN ONLY "WIN" (READ: KEEP HIS POSITION) IF THE PARTY DOES WELL IN THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS. IF IT HOLDS STEADY OR DECREASES ITS PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATION, THE NEW HARD-LINERS WILL SAY THAT THE RELATIVE FAILURE IS THE RESULT OF BLURRING THE PARTY'S IMAGE THROUGH ITS ASSOCIATION WITH THE PS AND MRG--AND THAT WILL IN FACT BECOME THE ISSUE OF A RIGHT REVOLT WITHIN THE PCF.

6. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CPSU: THE PCF CAME LATE TO ANTI-SOVIETISM AND THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT ITS PUBLIC IMAGE OF CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE USSR IS MADE UP OF CROCODILE TEARS SHED WHILE LOOKING AT  
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SOME VERY SOPHISTICATED POLLS TAKEN IN 1975. THESE POLLS SUGGESTED THAT ONE OF THE PRIMARY REASONS FOR FRENCH DISTRUST OF THE PARTY WAS ITS EXTREMELY CLOSE CONNECTIONS WITH THE CPSU AND THE SOVIET LINE ON SPECIFIC ISSUES. WHILE TO OUR KNOWLEDGE THE PARTY HAS NEVER CONSIDERED TAKING SOME OF ITS MOST SOVIET-LINE ISSUES OUT OF THE COMMON PROGRAM (A CALL FOR A WDC, ETC.), THERE HAVE BEEN INDICATIONS SINCE 1975 THAT IT WOULD LIKE TO CHANGE ITS PUBLIC IMAGE WHEREVER IT CAN DO SO WITHOUT AFFECTING THE FOUNDATIONS OF ITS LINKS TO THE CPSU. SOME OF THE STEPS IN THAT PROCESS HAVE BEEN LOUD AND PUBLIC (HUMAN RIGHTS, PCF COMMENTS ON THE CORVALAN/BUKOVSKY EXCHANGE) AND SOME HAVE BEEN FAR MORE DISCREET (LARGELY BECAUSE THE PRESS DID NOT PICK THEM UP IN ANY VERY SYSTEMATIC WAY--ONE THINKS OF CONTINUING RUMORS OF FURIOUS ARGUMENTS BETWEEN THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN PARIS AND THE PARTY). WHATEVER THE REASONS, THE PCF HAS BEEN TRYING TO PROJECT AN IMAGE OF GAULLO-COMMUNISM AT BEST; WHERE IT COULD NOT DO THAT, IT SOUGHT INSTEAD TO PROJECT AN IMAGE OF EURO-COMMUNISM. THE MOST RECENT CPSU ATTACKS ON THAT STRANGE HYBRID CREATURE SO INTIMATELY LINKED TO THE FATE OF THE LATIN COMMUNIST PARTIES SHOULD, IF THE LOGIC ABOVE IS CORRECT, HAVE AROUSED A STORM OF PCF WRATH. IT DID NOT. INSTEAD, IT WAS THE PC OF SPAIN WHICH FIRST TOOK ON THE JOB OF ANSWERING THE CPSU. WHY? SEVERAL REASONS HAVE BEEN SUGGESTED BY BOTH COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST OBSERVERS:

- FURTHER CRITICISM OF THE CPSU RIGHT NOW WOULD HAVE PUT THE PCF IN THE POSITION OF JOINING IN THE CURRENT WAVE OF ANTI-SOVIET MANIFESTATIONS WHICH THEY PERCEIVE AS BEING LED BY PRESIDENT CARTER;
- AS LONG AS THE PS IS RELATIVELY QUIET ON THESE ISSUES, THE PCF CAN AFFORD TO AVOID MAKING TROUBLE FOR ITSELF IN ITS OWN HOUSE;
- THE RANK-AND-FILE, TAUGHT FOR YEARS TO LOOK TO THE EAST FOR BASIC POLITICAL DEFINITIONS, HAS ALREADY

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BEEN ASKED TO SWALLOW MORE THAN IT SEEMS WILLING TO DIGEST. IF THE TREND CONTINUES, AS ONE PCF SECTION HEAD PUT IT, "WE'LL BE ASKING THEM TO DO NOTHING LESS THAN TO TURN THEIR BACKS ON THE VERY PARTY HISTORY WHICH THEY ONCE HAD TO FIGHT IN THE STREETS TO PROTECT." PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PCF AND THE CPSU ARE MIXED, AT LEAST GIVEN THE INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS OF THE PCF POSITION. WHILE WE WOULD NOT WISH TO PRE-EMPT EMBASSY MOSCOW'S ANALYSIS, WE NOTE THAT NO RESPECTABLE FRENCH OBSERVER CAN FIND ANY INTEREST ANALYSIS BY WHICH A UNITED LEFT VICTORY IN FRANCE WOULD BE A CAUSE FOR REJOICING IN THE KREMLIN. THIS PERCEP-

TION, WHICH APPEARS, AT LEAST IMPRESSIONISTICALLY TO BE SHARED BY THE PCF, SUGGESTS THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES ARE NOT LIKELY TO TAKE A SIGNIFICANT TURN FOR THE BETTER IN THE NEAR FUTURE (READ: PRIOR TO THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS).

7. PROSPECTS

THE VERY SHORT TERM: NEGOTIATING THE UPDATE OF THE COMMON PROGRAM IS THE FIRST REAL TEST OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PCF AND THE POST-NANTES PS. IF THE PCF CAN

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5629  
INFO USNMR SHAPE  
DIA WASHDC  
AMCONSUL NICE  
AMCONSUL MARSEILLE  
AMCONSUL BORDEAUX  
AMCONSUL STRASBOURG  
AMCONSUL LYON  
USCINCEUR  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST  
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
AMEMBASSY SOFIA  
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
USMISSION USBERLIN  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN  
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG  
AMEMBASSY OSLO  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
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USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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FIND WAYS OF KEEPING THE COMMON PROGRAM AT ITS PRESENT LEVEL OF MARXIST THINKING, IT WILL EMERGE FROM THESE NEGOTIATION IN A RELATIVELY PLIABLE STATE FRO NEGOTIATING ABOUT SEATS AND CANDIDACIES IN THE LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, IT COMES OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE FEELING THAT THE PS AND MRG HAVE GANGED UP TO FORM A COALITION AIMED AT CONVINCING FRENCH VOTERS OF LEFT RESPONSIBILITY (READ: AT CUTTING BACK ON THE COMMON PROGRAM), THAT WILL MAKE THE PCF AN EVEN MORE FORMIDABLE NEGOTIATOR IN PREPARING FOR THE ELECTIONS. THE SIGNS POINT TO A MID- COURSE SOLUTION: THE PCF WILL PROBABLY GET THE STATUS QUO ON THE COMMON PROGRAM AND WILL PROBABLY NOT GET THE DETAILED KIND OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTING WHICH IT WOULD LIKE TO HAVE. WITHOUT THAT, IT WILL HAVE TO FIND ITS OWN WAY OF CONVINCING ITS TROOPS THAT IT HAS NOT GIVEN WAY.

8. LOOKING FORWARD TO THE LEGISLATIVES: LIKE MOST PLLITICAL PARTIES, THE PCF WOULD LIKE TO HAVE ITS CAKE AND EAT IT TOO. WHILE IT WOULD HOPE TO ENJOY THE BENEFITS OF ELECTORAL ALLIANCE WITH THE PS AND MRG IN THOSE AREAS WHERE IT HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN WEAK (AS IT DID IN THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS), IT APPEARS TO BE RUNNING HEAD FIRST INTO A RISING PS TIDE OF INDEPENDENCE. THUS, THE SHORT- TERM PROSPECTS FOR UNION OF THE LEFT JOINT CANDIDACIES ON THE FIRST ROUND ARE VERY WEAK

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INDEED. THISS CAN CHANGE. ALL OF THE USUAL CAVEATS APPLY: ITS' S A LONG TIME UNTIL THE ELECTIONS: NO ONE YET

KNOWS WHAT CHIRAC AND THE RPR WILL DO; THE PCF ELECTORAL ANALYSIS IS FAR FROM COMPLETED. BUT ALL OF THIS IS FOR THE FUTURE-- RIGHT NOW THE MOOD IS FOR PRIMARIES WITHIN THE UNION OF THE LEFT WHEREVER THE PCF AND PS FEEL THEY CAN MAKE SOME VOTES. PERHAPS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT IS THE PCF'S PERCEPTION OF WHERE IT CAN SEEK NEW VOTERS. IF THE COMMUNISTS'S ELECTORAL ANALYSIS SAYS THAT IT CAN FIND NEW VOTERS IN THE CHRISTIAN MIDDLE CLASS, THEN THE NEW TOWNS AND IN THE NEW MIDDLE CLASSES, THE PROSPECTS FOR HEAD-ON CONFRONTATION WITH THE PS ARE ENHANCED. IF, AS MANY COMMUNISTS CURRENTLY BELIEVE, THE ISSUE IS PARTY SURVIVAL AT A TIME WHEN THE BLUE-COLLAR VOTE IS DROPPING AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A "DEMOGRAPHICALLY ADJUSTED" DROP ARE HIGH, THEN PROSPECTS FOR ACCORD ARE ENHANCED. BUT LOOKING AT THE SITUATION TODAY, PARTICULARLY THROUGH PCF EYES, IT IS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WILL BE ANY OTHER SOLUTION THAN ONE OF TOTAL PRIMARY WAR.

9. BEYOND THE LEGISLATURES- MARCHAIS' GAMBLE: THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS STAKED HIS POLITICAL CAREER ON ONE SIMPLE FACT-- THE UNION OF THE LEFT HAS TO PRODUCE BETTER RESULTS FOR THE PCF THAN THE PARTY WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FIND ALONE. IF IT DOES SO, MARCHAIS WILL HAVE WON HIS GAMBLE AND WILL BE ABLE TO ARGUE FOR "BENEVOLENT" PARTICIPATION IN THE UNITED LEFT GOVERNMENT IF THE PCF DROPS (AND NEARLY EVERY POLITICAL OBSERVER ON NOTE HAS HIS OWN FIGURE FOR WHAT KINDS OF POPULAR VOTE/SEAT COUNT COMBINATIONS WOULD CONSTITUTE THE SUICIDE THRESHOLD), MARCHAIS' LINE WILL HAVE BEEN REPUDIATED AND THE PCF (AND PERHAPS THE UNIONS) CAN BE EXPECTED TO BECOME A FAR MORE DISRUPTIVE ELEMENT IN THE GOF THAN IT MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN. THE DECISION TO REACH FOR POWER, REALLY REACH FOR SUBSTANTIVE, GOVERNMENTAL POWER, IS ONLY NINE YEARS OLD IN THE PCF-- IT IS FRAGILE, CAPABLE  
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OF BEING NOURISHED ONLY BY SU DSS AND CHIMERIC. IF THE PCF WINS (READ: DOES BETTER WITH THE UNITED LEFT THAN IT WOULD HAVE DONE WITHOUT IT), IT CAN GO ON TO SEEK A EURO-COMMUNIST VOCATION WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. IF IT LOSES, IT WILL BE TEMPTED TO SEEK ONCE MORE THE DESERT OF ITS OPPOSITION ISOLATION. THAT BY SO DOING IT COULD DRIVE THE PS INTO THE HANDS OF THE HISTORIC CENTER DOES NOT, AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT, APPEAR TO BE ITS PRIMARY WORRY. ITS CHOICE, WHICH IT WOULD THUS PERCEIVE AS ONE IMPELLED BY SELF-PRESERVATION, WOULD PRESUMABLY LEAD TO AN "APRES NOUS LE DELUGE" MENTALITY WITH RESPECT TO THE PS.  
HARTMAN

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